We will investigate several key transitions in the conceptions of logic in the line of development from 19th century German-language philosophy (Kant and Bolzano), to early 20th century Cambridge (early Russell and early Wittgenstein), to the participants in discussions about logic at Harvard in 1940-41 (Carnap, Tarski, Russell, and Quine), and finally, to two William James lecturers at Harvard later in the century (Austin and Dummett). The key questions for our discussion of each stage will be: What is identified as the proper domain of the science of logic? For what kind of items do logical forms function as forms? I will focus on five of the conceptions found along this historical-geographical path: (i) the mentalist conception of logic as specifying the forms of the operations of the intellect; (ii) the semantical conception of logic as specifying the forms of the intensional content of such activity; (iii) the ontological conception of logic as specifying the universally invariant forms of things 'in general'; (iv) the syntactical conception of logic as specifying the forms of linguistic expressions; and finally, (v) the pragmatical conception of logic as specifying the forms of contexts of speech-activity. A central theme will be the persistent worries about whether there can be any room for the concepts of subjectivity, intentionality, and agency within logic.